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Part I
Opinion article
When a tenth of humanity lost power over two days in India in July 2012, technical failure was not the only
culprit. Like many recent blackouts, this outage resulted from couplings among systems, including extreme
weather exacerbated by climate change, human operator errors, suboptimal policies, and market forces.
Predictions that climate change intensifies droughts and tropical cyclones presage more weather-induced
blackouts. Even without weather disasters, small disturbances can trigger cascading failures. Ill-designed
electricity markets can cause blackouts [1]. So can dependence on cyber infrastructure.
Reliable electricity provides more than convenience; it fuels economies, governments, health care, ed-
ucation and poverty reduction. As populations shift to cities and consume more energy, confronting the
multifaceted challenges to reliable electricity becomes paramount.
But enhancing reliability is no easy task. Upgrades can provide safety buffers, yet economic pressures
can quickly consume new capacity. The opposing objectives of reliability and cost balance such that massive
blackouts, albeit rare, continue to plague electric power systems [2]. Regulation is not a panacea either:
suppressing small blackouts, for instance, may increase the risk of large ones [2], a phenomenon that also
plagues forest fires [3]. Because blackouts are inevitable, ensuring that critical services survive during
blackouts should compete for investment with preventing them. Scientific understanding of decades-long
feedbacks should inform wise investment in robustness or resilience (e.g., harden against storm damage or
build distributed generation?).
The “smart grid”, which monitors and controls electrical infrastructure in detail, promises enhanced
reliability and efficiency, but it introduces concerns over privacy and cyber–physical interdependence. Fur-
thermore, no computer can reliably control power grids that span continents. Thus, human operators also
control the grid, occasionally making errors that trigger blackouts. We sorely lack convincing scientific
analyses of the interactions among human operators, protocols, automatic controls and physical grids.
A third objective increasingly shapes power systems: sustainability. Renewable, distributed energy
sources may confer resilience and mitigate climate change. But wind and solar’s intermittent generation
remains costly, and polluting fossil fuels fill the gap when renewables fall short of demand. Furthermore,
moving power from windy or sunny locations to cities couples distant regions. Connections among re-
gions of a power grid spread risk, like in other infrastructures (e.g., default among banks or viruses among
computers). Using models to determine optimal connectivity is a problem that transcends disciplines [3].
Tradeoffs of model complexity: Power grid modeling is not merely an academic exercise; in fact, mod-
els keep the lights on. Every hour, operators run thousands of simulations to determine the consequences
of plausible disturbances. However, power grid failures are difficult to model because they involve so many
complicated mechanisms.
The tradeoffs of model complexity apply to any complex system. Stylized models can reveal the big
picture and generate hypotheses, but throwing away rich data can relegate these models to irrelevance.
For instance, many stylized models of cascading failures in power grids treat blackouts as epidemics that
spread between adjacent nodes. By contrast, real blackouts also spread non-locally: after a component fails,
voltages and currents change throughout the network, potentially triggering failures hundreds of miles away.
Thus, naı¨ve, topological models of power grids offer little insight [4].
At the other extreme, models resembling flight simulators capture many details (usually of the physics,
not of the human operators and traders). Yet detailed models can obscure the important aspects and can
require parameters difficult to measure.
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Grand challenges: Modeling the feedbacks in Fig. SI-1 with accuracy but also insight is the first grand
challenge for transdisciplinary power grid science. New smart grid measurement devices provide orders-
of-magnitude more data with which to validate models. However, limited access to data severely impedes
research.
Validated models enable the next grand challenge: improve and transform power grids to meet 21st-
century pressures. Reliable electricity must reach more people demanding more energy in more places.
Even in developed countries, reliability continues to lag. Robustness against threats from interdependence
and malicious attacks will require transdisciplinary understanding. These challenges span engineering,
physics, complex networks, computational science, economics, and social sciences.
Ecology can also contribute. Like ecosystems, power grids consist of many species—generators, con-
sumers, operators, traders—subject to environmental pressures. Multi-scale feedbacks drive both ecosys-
tems and power grids to homeostasis or to collapse.
Unlike biological systems, however, power grids cannot rely on natural selection to adapt. It is up to
us. Scientists, engineers, policy makers and funding agencies must collaboratively tackle the challenges.
Integrating and transcending disciplines will enable new ideas to shape the electric power system, the
lifeblood of modern civilization.
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Part II
Supporting information
1 Illustration of the feedbacks
Figure SI-1 depicts the feedbacks surrounding electricity infrastructure, the component that engineers under-
stand best. The web of interacts resembles an ecosystem. Human operators and automated systems control
the grid to match generation with demand. Traders in markets bid on electric energy and trade electricity
derivative contracts. Wind and solar generators are intermittent and typically far from dense populations,
yet they mitigate the changes in climate that exacerbate blackout-causing extreme weather. Policy makers
balance reliability, sustainability and cost as they invest in infrastructure, subsidize energy alternatives, and
regulate operators and markets.
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Figure SI-1: Complex feedbacks surrounding electricity infrastructure.
2 Catastrophe from coupling
2.1 Recent systemic failures in power grids that stem from couplings among systems
Two articles in IEEE Spectrum [1, 2] highlight some causes of the blackout in India in July 2012. In particu-
lar, social and institutional failures—from imprudent policies for upgrading transmission lines to reluctance
to disconnect overdrawing regions [2]—played a key role. So did weather and perhaps climate change,
because farmers pumped more water to alleviate drought [2]. Superstorm Sandy’s costly consequences, in-
cluding those from the electric power blackout in the northeastern United States, are summarized in Ref. [3].
For research articles that find that climate change is intensifying droughts, see Ref. [4], and for tropical
cyclones, see Refs. [5, 6]. The aforementioned blackouts in India and in the northeastern US are examples
of blackouts partially caused by a drought and by a tropical cyclone, respectively.
Recent examples of cascading failures in developing countries include India 2012 [2] and Brazil 2012 [7].
For recent examples in developing countries, see Refs. [8] (southwestern USA 2011), [9] (northeastern North
America 2003), [10] (Italy 2003), [11] (Europe 2006).
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2.2 Why confronting the challenges to reliable electric power is important
Sixty percent of the global population is projected to live in urban areas in 2030 [12]. At the same time,
global energy demand is projected to rise 50% by 2030 [13].
3 More basics on the multilayered structure of electric power systems
Power grids comprise more than physical infrastructure, as illustrated in Fig. SI-1; they are also social and
market systems, and challenges span all three of the physical, human and market layers. At the center lies
what engineers understand best: the electrical infrastructure. Next, information and communication systems
monitor and control the electrical infrastructure at increasing levels of detail using new technology. Novel
capabilities of this cyber-physical “smart grid” promise to enhance reliability and efficiency, yet they risk
introducing privacy concerns, security vulnerabilities, and dependence between electricity and information
infrastructure.
3.1 How do human operators monitor and control power grids
In hundreds of control rooms across the United States, for instance, human operators augment automatic
control systems by monitoring an array of computer screens and by controlling the grid to match generation
with demand that varies throughout the day. The control centers coordinate with one another electronically
and by telephone. Typically, automatic and manual controllers balance supply and demand and respond to
contingencies without problems, but occasionally human controllers (or software or hardware) make errors
that cause blackouts [9, 8, 14].
3.2 Electricity markets
Humans also affect power grids through electricity markets—and in challenging new ways due to deregula-
tion and due to the smart grid. Over the past few decades, power systems around the world have shifted to
deregulated markets, in which suppliers compete by making bids to sell electric energy. But this competi-
tion has often fallen short on its promises of price reduction and better investment because market volatility
makes capital expensive, investment needs quick return, and congestion becomes profitable [15]. In light
of market catastrophes like the 2000–01 California energy crisis, the shift to deregulation continues but in
measured ways. The smart grid will simultaneously complicate and streamline these markets by enabling a
Cambrian explosion of new species, from small-scale generators that inject renewable energy into the grid,
to smart appliances that bid for energy within price limits set by their owners.
3.3 Electricity production’s greenhouse gas emissions and climate change
Feedback loops between electricity infrastructure and climate are slower but no less significant than the
interactions with markets. Generating electricity produces more greenhouse gas emissions than any other
economic sector (e.g., 34% in the US [16], 26% in the EU [17], 24% globally [18]). These greenhouse
gases contribute to global climate change, which poses significant risks to human health and welfare [19].
Furthermore, climate change jeopardizes reliable electric power because it intensifies the droughts [4] and
tropical cyclones [5, 6] that cause blackouts [2, 3].
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3.4 Grid reliability, the n−1 criterion, and similarity to systemic risk in other fields
A key reliability standard intended to mitigate risk of cascading failures is the “n−1 criterion”, which
requires that blackouts not result from the failure of any single component in the grid. A major challenge
is that hundreds of organizations operate portions of each synchronous, interconnected grid (of which there
are three in the US), and no organization knows the state of the entire grid. Recent blackouts spreading
from one area to another [2, 8] prompted discussion of expanding the n−1 criterion to require greater
coordination among control areas. Designing and operating the interconnected control areas so that they
collectively reduce the system-wide risk of cascading failure, without compromising their local performance,
presents formidable challenges. Risk spreads in other infrastructures, too, such as default among banks or
computer viruses among Autonomous Systems of the Internet. Thus, using models to determine optimal
interdependence and control is a problem that transcends disciplines [20, 21].
4 Tradeoffs of model complexity
Examples of the many complicated mechanisms involved in blackouts include thermal overloads, relay
failure, voltage collapse, dynamic instability and operator error [22]. State-of-the-art models capture only
a subset of these failure mechanisms; for examples, see Refs. [22, 23] and the review article on cascading
failures in electric power systems [24].
5 Grand challenges for a transdisciplinary science of electric power systems
5.1 Starting points for finding data on power grids
Though power grid data is difficult to obtain, there is some available, useful data:
• The freely available software MATPOWER [25] provides a useful starting point; for instance, it con-
tains data on the Polish transmission system, which has been used in academic papers (e.g., [22])
• Several of the US Independent System Operators (ISOs) provide information about their historical
load, load forecast, and economic data. For example, see http://www.iso-ne.com/markets/
hrly_data/.
• The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) recently published large sets of simulated wind
speed and power data. See, for example, http://www.nrel.gov/electricity/transmission/
eastern_wind_methodology.html.
• The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) publishes some good data about transmission outages:
http://transmission.bpa.gov/business/operations/Outages/default.aspx
• In an effort to address the challenge of obtaining data for research and industry analysis, the Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA) is proposing new data collection activities that will begin in 2014; for
information on this effort see http://www.eia.gov/survey/changes/electricity/
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5.2 Examples of reliable electricity needing to reach more people
A prominent example of the need to provide more electricity (and with greater reliability) is India, where
300 million people lack electricity [2, 13]. Developed countries continue to suffer outages, too; in the US,
for instance, about a million people lose power every day on average [26].
5.3 Threats from terrorist attacks that leverage interdependence among components of the
electric power system
The National Academy of Sciences report on robustness and resilience of the electric power system in
the United States [27] highlights dangers from the power system’s age, inadequate guards against malicious
attack, and interdependence with other infrastructure (like wireless communication), all of which exacerbate
the risks of costly blackouts caused by extreme weather [3] or by terrorist attack [27]. Whereas blackouts
lasting days typically cost millions of dollars, blackouts lasting months (because of damage to hard-to-
replace transformers, for example) could cost billions [27, 28].
6 Why “transdisciplinary”?
A useful resource for the definitions of multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary is Choi et
al., 2006 [29] and two followup papers [30, 31]. For an illustration of these terms, see Fig. SI-2.
In short, multidisciplinary problems sub-divide into independent subproblems that can be solved by
practitioners in different disciplines, without much need for communication between the disciplines. By
contrast, interdisciplinary problems require blending multiple fields and hence the creation of new knowl-
edge between two fields. Transdisciplinary problems also require blending fields, but they create entirely
new knowledge and techniques outside those fields. Tackling problems with large-scale feedbacks among
different systems and with commonalities among other complex systems often becomes transdisciplinary.
When it is not clear which kind of approach applies, Choi et al. [29, 30, 31] recommend using the word
“multiple disciplinary”.
Some of the challenges highlighted in the opinion article may be multidisciplinary; for example, research
into mitigating climate change and into reducing emissions from electricity generation can proceed rather
independently (multidisciplinary). Other problems will be interdisciplinary. The smart grid, for instance,
combines communication and electrical infrastructure together with new market capabilities (see Sec. 3),
so understanding these systems will likely blend these disciplines. For example, monitoring smart grids
may benefit from knowledge about percolation in random graphs [32]. Models of feedbacks on long spa-
tiotemporal scales, such as of reliability and cost [33, 23], and models that address problems with analogs
in other complex systems, such as optimal connectivity [20], begin to leave disciplinary boundaries (trans-
disciplinary).
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